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1 Introduction
Little consensus has been reached among economists about the effects of government
spending on consumption. In their seminal paper, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use a
VAR model and identify a government spending shock by imposing that government
spending is not affected on impact by any other shock. The main finding is that govern-
ment spending leads to a large increase in consumption. Similar results are obtained
by Fatas and Mihov (2001), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), and Perotti (2002, 2007).
On the contrary, Ramey and Shapiro (1998), using a dummy variables identification
approach, find that consumption falls, implying a very small value for the govern-
ment spending multiplier. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Cavallo (2005),
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) and Ramey
(2009) have similar findings.
Most of the empirical analyses have focused on aggregate consumption. From
a theoretical point of view however the importance of going beyond the representa-
tive consumer and allowing for agents heterogeneity is well-understood, see Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante (2009) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001). Hetero-
geneity can be particularly relevant for fiscal policy, see Kaplan (2011) and Heathcote
(2005). The latter finds that with consumers heterogeneity and borrowing constraints,
lump-sum cuts, which are neutral under the representative agent setting, turn out to
have large real effects. Gali, Lopez Salido, and Valles (2007) extends the representa-
tive agent Neo-Keynesian model by introducing two types of consumers: consumers
who are constrained in that they do not have access to capital market (”rule-of-thumb
consumers”) and Ricardian optimizing consumers. They show that the two types re-
spond very differently to the government spending shock. More specifically while rule-
of-thumb consumers increase consumption because a Keynesian style multiplier is at
work, consumer with access to capital markets reduce consumption because the Ricar-
dian equivalence appears to hold.
If these theoretical considerations are also empirically important, then limiting the
attention to the response of aggregate consumption can hide important features of the
reaction of consumption to government spending shocks. So probably the question
whether aggregate consumption increase or falls after a government spending shock is
misleading. The correct question to address is where, in the consumption distribution,
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consumption increases or falls.
While the empirical macro literature has completely neglected heterogeneity so far,
on the empirical micro front there are a few contributions providing evidence about the
effects of tax rebates on consumption, see for instance Johnson, Parker, and Souleles
(2006) and Misra and Surico (2011). In these papers, a high degree of heterogeneity
in the response of consumption is typically found. To our knowledge, however, no
evidence on the heterogeneity in the response of consumption to government spending
shocks is available.
We try to fill this gap in the current paper. We investigate the effects of government
spending shocks on the whole consumption distribution. The goal is twofold. First,
to unveil potential heterogeneity in the response of consumption which are hidden in
the analyses using aggregate variables. Second, to investigate what class of theoretical
models the heterogeneity can lend empirical support to.
In order to develop our analysis we first construct household non-durable consump-
tion expenditures from CEX data between the first quarter of 1984, and the fourth
quarter of 2010 (all the available data at the time of writing). Then we compute the
deciles of the consumption distribution and estimate, using the principal component
estimator, the component of these variables driven by macroeconomic conditions and
aggregate shocks, the so-called common component. Finally we use the common com-
ponents of the consumption deciles in a VAR to study how they respond to government
spending shocks. The government spending shock is identified using two alternative
procedures. One is that proposed in Ramey (2011): the use newspaper sources to
construct a variable containing exogenous episodes of government spending. The sec-
ond is that proposed in Gambetti (2012) and is based on forecast revisions of long-run
government spending.
Our main result is that after a government spending shock consumption increases
at the bottom of the distribution (1st and 2nd deciles) while it falls at the top (7th to
10th deciles). The middle of the distribution responds very little. The result implies a
significant temporary reduction of consumption inequality measured as the difference
between top and bottom decile. A strong negative correlation, around -0.7/-0.9 depend-
ing on the particular identification strategy, between the effects of the shock within the
first year and the percentage of stockholders within the decile emerges. While in the
first decile only 7% of the households hold stocks, at the top of the distribution around
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40% of the households hold some financial asset. We interpret this result as in line and
yielding support to models of limited participation where consumers with no access
to capital market increase consumption, as implied by the Keynesian multiplier, while
consumer who actively participate in the capital markets reduce consumption because
the Ricardian equivalence holds.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data;
section 3 describes the econometric framework; section 4 present and discusses the
results; section 5 concludes.
2 Data description and stylized facts
We construct household non-durable consumption from CEX data spanning from the
first quarter of 1984 to the fourth quarter of 2008. The CEX records consumption and
expenditure for a large set of goods together with demographics and other households
characteristics as income, assets and so on.1 Here we focus on real non durable con-
sumption expenditure per adult equivalent to capture household size and economies
of scale effects (as in Attanasio and Weber, 1995, Krueger and Perri, 2006, Attanasio,
Battistin and Padula, 2009, Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2009).2 Nominal consump-
tion expenditure is constructed using the definition in Attanasio and Weber (1995);
real consumption is nominal consumption divided by the CPI.3
We then construct consumption deciles using the population weights provided in
the CEX. As we observe households more than once we need to decide how to define
our deciles as households can move in and out of those deciles, in fact we have evidence
that those movements are neither negligible nor confined to the marginal households.
We assign households to a given decile once and for all by ordering households mean
1For a detailed description of the CEX see Attanasio and Weber, 1995, Goldenberg and Ryan, 2009,
and Battistin and Padula, 2010.
2We use an equivalence scale suggested by the World Bank, i.e. we divide our relevant variables by
the squared root of the number of household members.
3In particular we refer to the following definition extracted by Attanasio and Weber (1995), “...In
what follows we consider various components of nondurable expenditure. In particular, for reasons to be
discussed below, we look at food (defined as the sum of food at home, food away from home, alcohol, and
tobacco) and expenditure on other nondurable goods and services, such as services, heating fuel, public
and private transport (including gasoline), and personal care, and semidurables, defined as clothing and
footwear...”.
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nondurable consumption expenditure overtime. As a typical household is observed for
3 quarters, this in practice means that we average household consumption over that
time period and we order that average to locate each household in the appropriate
decile. This is quite important since, in so doing, we avoid confounding true variation
with compositional changes in the various deciles. At the same time the averaging over
the available waves, for each household, also reduces the extent of measurement error
in the ranking of the consumption measure.
As the sample sizes for the CEX cohorts have changed over time, by using deciles,
rather than smaller aggregations, we make sure that there are at least 80 households per
decile, with max of over 300 per decile. At the same time we still preserve a substantial
amount of heterogeneity as our analysis shows.4
It has to be noticed that our non durable consumption measure corresponds to about
44% of the after tax income for a typical (average) household. That share increases
with income and consumption deciles. So that it is a smaller share for the very bottom
decile at about 40% with the share being about 62% in the highest decile. Another
observation is that the food share over our consumption measure decreases along the
consumption deciles, from a high 50% at the bottom to about 25% for the top decile
of the distribution.
In Table 1 we detail several characteristics of the composition of the different deciles.
The table makes clear that different deciles include very different agents rather than
similar consumers differing for their saving/consumption choices. First, as expected
income increases in the deciles. Second, marked differences emerge in race: it is striking
that the bottom 3 deciles contain more than 50% of the African American in the sample,
with almost a quarter of blacks in the bottom decile. Third, in terms of education, as
one would expect, the lower educated cluster in the bottom deciles. In particular more
than half of the (up to) high-school drop outs are in the bottom 3 deciles. At the same
time one in two college graduates or higher is found in the top 3 deciles of consumption.
As one would expect education is a close proxy for permanent income and therefore
is positively related to consumption. Finally and most importantly, there are large
differences across deciles in terms of asset market participation. Not surprisinly, the
share of households holding any financial asset, excluding housing, increases in the
4Dividing the data in twentiles has very little qualitative effect on the results presented in the current
paper.
5
deciles. It is about 25% on average (across deciles), but goes from 6% in the bottom
decile to 40% in the very top decile. These figures are in line with those in Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991). This last fact is of particular importance in our perspective since
below we will try to relate the responses of the consumption distribution to government
spending shock with the extent of asset market participation.
3 Econometric framework
Estimation of the effects of government spending shocks on consumption entails two
steps. First cleaning the data from noise and measurement errors in order to obtain
the component of the consumption deciles driven by common aggregate macroeconomic
shocks. Second, identifying and estimating the effects of the shock. We describe the
two steps below.
3.1 Estimating the common component of the consumption deciles
Individual consumption data are plagued by measurement errors, idiosyncratic terms
and other components which are completely unrelated to macroeconomic conditions in
particular to government spending. When computing the distribution deciles many of
these household-specific components will be averaged out. However still one can reason-
ably expect some of the idiosyncratic components to not completely vanish. Therefore
as a first step in our analysis we try to ”clean” the deciles data from such compo-
nents. To do that we proceed by specifying a formal econometric framework following
De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012). Let cit be the consumption of the i-th decile for
i = 1, ..., 10. We assume that cit is the sum of two orthogonal components, the com-
mon component χit and the idiosyncratic component ξit:
cit = χit + ξit (1)
The common component is the part of consumption which is driven by common aggre-
gate macroeconomic shocks while the idiosyncratic component contains decile-specific
characteristics unrelated to aggregate shocks. The common components are common in
that they are linear combinations of a relatively small number r of possibly unobserved
factors in ft,
χit = aift (2)
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where the factor loading ai are decile-specific.
To estimate the unobserved factors we use the ten principal components of a large
panel of macroeconomic data containing 108 quarterly series from 1984:I to 2010:IV
(see the Appendix for details). More formally, let xt be the (column) vector containing
the 109 macroeconomic time series and the ten consumption deciles; let Γx be the
sample variance-covariance matrix of xt. The estimated factors are fˆt = Aˆ
′xt where Aˆ
is the 119×10 matrix having on the columns the normalized eigenvectors corresponding
to the first largest 10 eigenvalues of Γx.5 The estimated loadings for the consumption
deciles, aˆi, are simply the corresponding row of Aˆ. Once the estimates of the factors fˆt
and the loading are available the estimated common components are χˆit = aˆifˆt.
The approach has two main advantages. First, as mentioned, it allows to separate
the component attributable to government spending and other macroeconomic shocks
from the decile-specific terms. Second, as shown in De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012),
such a procedure produces data which are very similar to PCE consumption data at
business cycle frequencies, i.e. our transformed CEX data series matches very closely
the aggregate measure of consumption derived from the National Accounts.
3.2 Identification of the government spending shock
The effects of government spending shocks are obtained using a VAR model. The
model includes the ten common components of the consumption deciles plus a variable
which drives the identification of the government spending shock. The identification
government spending shock is still an open question. It is well known that different
approaches provide different results in terms of aggregate consumption. In this paper we
prefer not to rely on identification schemes a` la Blanchard and Perotti (2003) because of
the evidence provided in Ramey (2011) and Forni and Gambetti (2011). These last two
papers show that approach proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2003) delivers a shock
which is Granger caused by the forecast of government spending from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. In other terms the shock cannot be the government spending
shock. Moreover, under fiscal foresight, that is when government policies are anticipated
by the agents, on the one hand identification schemes based on combinations of the VAR
residuals are likely to fail in recovering the structural shocks (see Leeper, Walker and
Yang, 2011). On the other hand if policies take time to affect fiscal variables imposing
5The number of factors, 10, is obtained by applying the Bai and Ng (2002) criterion.
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a contemporaneous effect on government spending, as implied by the Blanchard and
Perotti (2003) identification, can yield very misleading results.
Given the considerations above, we rely on two alternative identification strategies.
One is that proposed in Ramey (2011): using the Business Week and other newspaper
sources, constructs a variable containing exogenous episodes of government spending.
More specifically the variable measures changes in the expected present value of govern-
ment spending triggered by exogenous events. The second is that proposed in Gambetti
(2012) and is based on forecast revision of long-run government spending. While the
former is largely known, we will explain the second one in more details. Let gt be the
logarithm of government spending, gt+q|t the logarithm of the q-periods ahead forecast
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters given the information available at time t.6
We define the following two long run forecasts
h1t = gt+4|t − gt+1|t
h2t−1 = gt+4|t−1 − gt+1|t−1.
The variable to predict, the sum of the growth rate between time t+ 2 an t+ 4, is the
same in the two forecasts. What changes is the information set. Indeed h1t is formed
using information up to time t while h2t is formed using the information only up to time
t− 1. The forecast revision is, then, defined as the difference
rt = h
1
t − h2t−1. (3)
This variable represents the change in the long run expectation of government spending
due to the new information released at time t which was not available at time t − 1,
i.e. the ”news”. A positive value of rt means that professional forecasters learn (e.g.
passing of a law) that government spending will increase, not immediately, but in the
future.7
The main advantage of the first approach is that the Ramey’s variable includes only
truly exogenous changes in government spending. The main advantage of the second
identification procedure is that it incorporates valuable information available to eco-
nomic agents but presumably not conveyed in fiscal variables and consequently omitted
6We focus on forecasts of the growth rate because in the SPF dataset the forecast have different
base year the levels cannot be used.
7Gambetti (2012) discusses the informational content of the forecast revision variable and shows
that it is helpful for forecasting government spending.
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in standard specifications. Moreover both identification procedures leave the impact
response of government spending completely unrestricted. In particular, government
spending can respond with several periods of delay as implied by fiscal foresight.
Identification is implemented as follows. The identifying variable, the Ramey’s
variable or the forecast revision, is ordered first in the VAR and the first shock in the
Cholesky representation is interpreted as a government spending shock.8
4 Results
4.1 Statistical properties of the consumption deciles
We start off by examining the dynamics of the consumption deciles in terms of volatil-
ities and correlations. Figure 1 shows the standard deviations and the correlations of
the common component (second row), the idiosyncratic component (third row) and
the common component at the business cycle frequencies of the common component
(fourth row).9
As for the raw data (first row), both the common and the idiosyncratic component
are substantially more volatile at the top end of the distribution. Both the idiosyncratic
and the common components of the 10th decile are about twice more volatile than that
of the other deciles. At business cycle frequencies the first and the tenth decile are the
most volatile with standard deviations which are about 50% larger than those of the
remaining deciles.
The second column of Figure 1 shows the correlations between consumption deciles.
Each rectangular cell displays the correlation between the consumption decile specified
in the x-axis and the y-axis; the higher the correlation the lighter the color of the
corresponding cell. It is quite evident, irrespective of whether one looks at the raw
data or the common component, that consumption at the two tails of the distribution
8The potential drawback of the second identification strategy is that the innovation in the forecast
revision does not necessarily contain only exogenous government spending shocks. In fact the revi-
sion might in principle change contemporaneously because of predicted future increase in government
spending reflecting change in systematic fiscal policy. This is not the case in practice as, if we order
the variable after the GDP and considered the second Cholesky shock as government pending shock,
the results are unchanged.
9The business cycle frequencies are computed with a band-pass filter which retains fluctuations
between 2 to 8 years.
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is less correlated with all the other deciles. The average correlation of the first and
tenth deciles are 0.29 and 0.42. The numbers are higher than those obtained for raw
data but still small. On the contrary, the consumption deciles from the second to the
seventh present very high correlations, higher than those in the raw data. For instance
the average correlation between the second and seventh decile is about 0.93.
We begin investigating the relation between consumption and government spend-
ing by simply looking at some unconditional correlations between consumption deciles
and some selected fiscal policy variables, see Table 2. Unconditional correlations with
government expenditures are quite low and comparable across deciles. Substantial
differences, amongst the consumption deciles, emerge for social benefits and primary
deficit measures. First, the correlations with government social benefits are positive
for the first deciles, vanishing for the middle deciles and becoming negative for the
right tail of the consumption distribution. The result seems very plausible suggesting
that consumers at the bottom deciles are those who benefit most from social security
programs. Second, a similar pattern in terms of heterogeneity emerges for the primary
deficit: the left tail of the consumption distribution is positively correlated with deficit
while the right tail is negatively correlated. We interpret the finding as a prima facie
evidence that government spending and fiscal policy in general might have very differ-
ent effect in different part of the consumption distribution. In particular this pattern of
correlations suggests a non-Ricardian behavior of the poor households and a Ricardian
one for the agents at the top of the consumption distribution.
4.2 The effects of government spending shocks
Figure 2-3 display the impulse response functions at selected horizons for the consump-
tion deciles. Solid lines are the point estimates, dotted lines are the 68% confidence
bands obtained with bootstrap (see Forni and Gambetti (2010) for details). In the
plots the x-axis refers to the decile, the y-axis measures the effect on consumption in
percentage terms.
The most striking feature, common to both identifications, that emerges is that
the effects of the government spending shocks fall (from positive to negative) with the
deciles: the higher the decile the smaller (or negative) the effect. This is particularly
pronounced for horizon of one quarter and one year. More specifically the spending
shock raises consumption for the bottom 20% of the distribution and reduces it at the
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top. The size and the significance of the effects vary somewhat using the two identifi-
cation strategies. The effects tend to be larger and more significant using the Ramey’s
identification. In this case (Identification 1 ) the consumption of the first decile increases
by 0.4% while that of the tenth decile falls by 0.4% and the effects are both statistically
significant. Using the forecast revision strategy (Identification 2 ), consumption in the
1st and 10th decile increases and falls by about 0.2% respectively. The middle deciles
respond very little to the shock. At 2 and 3-year horizons the response is negative for all
the deciles but the first one. The results here are similar to those obtained in Misra and
Surico (2011) using tax rebates, where they find that 45% of the household behave as
Ricardian households, while around 30% of the households significantly increase their
consumption following the tax rebate. Moreover these authors find, again in line with
our results, that 20% of the households are credit constrained.
One implication of the previous result is that the government spending shock tem-
porarily reduces consumption inequality. Figure 4 displays the responses of consump-
tion inequality measured as the difference between the responses of the 8th and 3rd
decile (first column) and 10th and 1st decile (second column) in the two identifications;
the Ramey’s one is in the first row, the Gambetti’s one is in the second row. In all cases,
consumption inequality significantly falls in the short run, while at longer horizons the
shock has no effects.
The kind of effects across deciles discussed above are in line with models of limited
participation to the asset market where consumers with no access to the capital market
increase their consumption, because a sort of Keynesian multiplier is at work, while
wealthier consumers, who actively participate in the capital markets, reduce their con-
sumption because the Ricardian equivalence holds. According to the data description
seen above, asset market participation measured as the share of stockholders within
the decile is increasing with the deciles (see Table 1). Figure 5 plots the average re-
sponse of consumption deciles (y-axis) and the share of stockholders within the decile
(x-axis). A strong negative relation emerges: the correlation coefficient is -0.93 under
the Ramey’s identification and -0.76 under the alternative scheme. An increase of 1%
of the share of consumers holding asset within the decile is associated with a reduc-
tion of consumption within the decile of about 1.16% under the Ramey’s identification
and 0.46% under the alternative identification. Although quite narrative in spirit, we
believe that the evidence provided in the current paper is in line and lends support to
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the theory discussed earlier.10
5 Conclusions
In this paper we study the responses of the consumption distribution to government
spending shocks. We move away from aggregate consumption data and, instead, in-
vestigate the responses of the whole consumption distribution (partitioned in deciles).
Allowing for heterogeneity in the responses unveil a novel and important result: con-
sumption increases at the bottom and falls at the top of the distribution after an
increase in government spending. This implies a significant temporary reduction of
consumption inequality. The effects of the shock display correlations of around -0.7/-
0.9 with the share of stockholders within the decile. We interpret the results as in line
and lending support to models of limited participation to capital markets where, while
the Ricardian equivalence holds for wealthier households, for poor household, with no
access to capital markets, a kind of Keynesian multiplier is at work. To conclude,
we believe that the question whether aggregate consumption increase or falls after a
government spending shock is probably misleading. The correct question to address is
where, in the consumption distribution, consumption increases or falls.
10A further check of the validity of our interpretation would be to compute the decile of the asset
distribution and study the response of the shock to the corresponding consumption data. This strategy
however is not feasible since the financial wealth data are top coded in the CEX.
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Appendix
Macro Data
Transformations: 1=levels, 2= first differences of the original series, 5= first differences of logs of the original
series.
no.series Transf. Mnemonic Long Label
1 5 GDPC1 Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal
2 5 GNPC96 Real Gross National Product
3 5 NICUR/GDPDEF National Income/GDPDEF
4 5 DPIC96 Real Disposable Personal Income
5 5 OUTNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Output
6 5 FINSLC1 Real Final Sales of Domestic Product, 1 Decimal
7 5 FPIC1 Real Private Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal
8 5 PRFIC1 Real Private Residential Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal
9 5 PNFIC1 Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal
10 5 GPDIC1 Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, 1 Decimal
11 5 PCECC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
12 5 PCNDGC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods
13 5 PCDGCC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods
14 5 PCESVC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services
15 5 GPSAVE/GDPDEF Gross Private Saving/GDP Deflator
16 5 FGCEC1 Real Federal Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment, 1 Decimal
17 5 FGEXPND/GDPDEF Federal Government: Current Expenditures/ GDP deflator
18 5 FGRECPT/GDPDEF Federal Government Current Receipts/ GDP deflator
19 2 FGDEF Federal Real Expend-Real Receipts
20 1 CBIC1 Real Change in Private Inventories, 1 Decimal
21 5 EXPGSC1 Real Exports of Goods & Services, 1 Decimal
22 5 IMPGSC1 Real Imports of Goods & Services, 1 Decimal
23 5 CP/GDPDEF Corporate Profits After Tax/GDP deflator
24 5 NFCPATAX/GDPDEF Nonfinancial Corporate Business: Profits After Tax/GDP deflator
25 5 CNCF/GDPDEF Corporate Net Cash Flow/GDP deflator
26 5 DIVIDEND/GDPDEF Net Corporate Dividends/GDP deflator
27 5 HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons
28 5 OPHNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons
29 5 UNLPNBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Nonlabor Payments
30 5 ULCNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost
31 5 WASCUR/CPI Compensation of Employees: Wages & Salary Accruals/CPI
32 5 COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour
33 5 COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour
34 5 GDPCTPI Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index
35 5 GNPCTPI Gross National Product: Chain-type Price Index
36 5 GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator
37 5 GNPDEF Gross National Product: Implicit Price Deflator
38 5 INDPRO Industrial Production Index
39 5 IPBUSEQ Industrial Production: Business Equipment
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no.series Transf. Mnemonic Long Label
40 5 IPCONGD Industrial Production: Consumer Goods
41 5 IPDCONGD Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods
42 5 IPFINAL Industrial Production: Final Products (Market Group)
43 5 IPMAT Industrial Production: Materials
44 5 IPNCONGD Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods
45 2 AWHMAN Average Weekly Hours: Manufacturing
46 2 AWOTMAN Average Weekly Hours: Overtime: Manufacturing
47 2 CIVPART Civilian Participation Rate
48 5 CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force
49 5 CE16OV Civilian Employment
50 5 USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries
51 5 USGOOD All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries
52 5 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries
53 5 UNEMPLOY Unemployed
54 5 UEMPMEAN Average (Mean) Duration of Unemployment
55 2 UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate
56 5 HOUST Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started
57 2 FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate
58 2 TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
59 2 GS1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
60 2 GS10 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
61 2 AAA Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield
62 2 BAA Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield
63 2 MPRIME Bank Prime Loan Rate
64 5 BOGNONBR Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions
65 5 TRARR Board of Governors Total Reserves, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve
66 5 BOGAMBSL Board of Governors Monetary Base, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve
67 5 M1SL M1 Money Stock
68 5 M2MSL M2 Minus
69 5 M2SL M2 Money Stock
70 5 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks
71 5 CONSUMER Consumer (Individual) Loans at All Commercial Banks
72 5 LOANINV Total Loans and Investments at All Commercial Banks
73 5 REALLN Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks
74 5 TOTALSL Total Consumer Credit Outstanding
75 5 CPIAUCSL Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items
76 5 CPIULFSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food
77 5 CPILEGSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Energy
78 5 CPILFESL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food & Energy
79 5 CPIENGSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Energy
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no.series Transf. Mnemonic Long Label
80 5 CPIUFDSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Food
81 5 PPICPE Producer Price Index Finished Goods: Capital Equipment
82 5 PPICRM Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for Further Processing
83 5 PPIFCG Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods
84 5 PPIFGS Producer Price Index: Finished Goods
85 5 OILPRICE Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate
86 5 USSHRPRCF US Dow Jones Industrials Share Price Index (EP) NADJ
87 5 US500STK US Standard & poor’s Index if 500 Common Stocks
88 5 USI62...F US Share Price Index NADJ
89 5 USNOIDN.D US Manufacturers New Orders for Non Defense Capital Goods (BCI 27)
90 5 USCNORCGD US New Orders of Consumer Goods & Materials (BCI 8) CONA
91 1 USNAPMNO US ISM Manufacturers Survey: New Orders Index SADJ
92 5 USVACTOTO US Index of Help Wanted Advertising VOLA
93 5 USCYLEAD US The Conference Board Leading Economic Indicators Index SADJ
94 5 USECRIWLH US Economic Cycle Research Institute Weekly Leading Index
95 2 GS10-FEDFUNDS
96 2 GS1-FEDFUNDS
97 2 BAA-FEDFUNDS
98 5 GEXPND/GDPDEF Government Current Expenditures/ GDP deflator
99 5 GRECPT/GDPDEF Government Current Receipts/ GDP deflator
100 2 GDEF Government Real Expend-Real Receipts
101 5 GCEC1 Real Government Cons. Expenditures & Gross Investment, 1 Decimal
102 5 Real Federal Cons. Expenditures & Gross Investment National Defense
103 2 Federal primary deficit
104 5 Real Federal Current Tax Revenues
105 5 Real Government Current Tax Revenues
106 2 Government primary deficit
107 5 Real (/GDPDEF) Gov. Social Benefit
108 1 Gov. social benefits/ Gov. Curr Exp
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Decile Gov. Spending Social Benefits Primary Deficit
1 0.2593 0.4933 0.2787
2 0.2930 0.3293 0.1324
3 0.2686 0.1820 0.0511
4 0.2407 0.0597 -0.0328
5 0.1991 0.0283 -0.0421
6 0.1254 -0.1245 -0.1569
7 0.1004 -0.1321 -0.1521
8 0.1733 -0.1902 -0.1169
9 -0.0287 -0.3562 -0.1528
10 0.2176 -0.2312 -0.2548
Table 2: Sample correlation of the common component of the consumption deciles
with some fiscal policy variables.
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Figures
Figure 1: Standard deviations and correlations of consumption deciles. First row: raw
data; second row: common component; third row: idiosyncratic component; fourth
row: common component at the business cycle frequencies computed using a band bass
filter which retains fluctuations between 2 to 8 years.
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Figure 2: Response of the consumption deciles to a government spending shock identi-
fied using the Ramey’s variable.
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Figure 3: Response of the consumption deciles to a government spending shock identi-
fied using the forecast revision variable.
24
Figure 4: Response of consumption inequality measured as the difference between the
response of the 10th and 1st decile (first column) and 10th and 1st decile (second col-
umn) in the two identifications; the Ramey’s one is in the first row, the Gambetti’s one
is in the second row.
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Figure 5: Plot of the average response of consumption deciles (y-axis) and the share of
stockholders within the decile (x-axis).
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